@ngrok/ngrok
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-execsync | AI (semgrep): Used solely for musl/glibc detection to load correct native binary; stable pattern for this napi-rs package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): Same musl-detection use case; not a security concern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.7.0 | 0 / 14 | |
| 1.6.1 | 0 / 14 | |
| 1.6.0 | 0 / 14 | |
| 1.5.2 | 0 / 14 | |
| 1.5.1 | 0 / 14 |
v1.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.