@ni/ok-angular
Angular components for NI OK Components
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from ni-webapps-ops to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance; legitimate automation change for this NI org package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a known Angular/TypeScript implicit runtime dependency; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 82 of 82)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.4.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.4.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.4.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.4.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.4.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.4.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.4.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.3.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.3.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.2.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.2.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.1.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.1.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.1.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.1.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.1.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.10 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.9 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.2.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.2.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.2.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.22 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.21 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.20 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.19 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.18 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.17 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.16 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.15 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.14 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.13 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.12 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.11 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.10 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.9 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.22 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.21 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.20 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.19 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.18 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.17 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.16 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.15 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.14 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.12 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.10 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 0 |
v2.4.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.22
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.22
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.