@nimbus-ds/modal
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@nimbus-ds/icon | AI (dependencies): Internal sibling package from the same nimbus-design-system monorepo; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@nimbus-ds/icons | AI (dependencies): Internal sibling package from the same nimbus-design-system monorepo; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Legitimate design system component; missing description is cosmetic, not a risk indicator. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package from known org; lack of provenance is common and not a risk here. | ai |
v1.9.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.9.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.8.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.