@noble/post-quantum
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
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Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.1 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.6.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.5.4 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.5.3 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.5.2 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.5.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.5.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.4.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.4.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.3.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 6 |
v0.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
1 findingThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
v0.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.