@notion-kit/selectable
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@notion-kit/cn | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the same notion-kit monorepo; same publisher and versioning scheme. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.17.0 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.16.0 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.15.1 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.15.0 | 2 / 10 |
v0.17.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.16.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.15.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.