@nutui/nutui
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Diff baseline is an old unimported version; publisher has continuous CI/CD-attested releases since. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Publisher switch is provenance-attested (trusted CI/CD), not account takeover. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Result of diffing against a stale unimported baseline, not injected code. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:sass | AI (phantom-deps): sass used via style pipeline, not direct import; expected for a component library. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Accompanied by SLSA/CI provenance improvement, consistent with org-managed publishing handoff. | ai |
v4.3.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.13
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (eiinu) than the most recent previously approved version (nutui) on 2024-09-14, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.3.12
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (eiinu) than the most recent previously approved version (nutui) on 2024-08-02, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.3.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.