@nuxt/rspack-builder
rspack bundler for Nuxt
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Nuxt monorepo publishes via GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; this is the expected publisher going forward. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Nuxt team consolidated publishing to GitHub Actions; maintainer list change is intentional org-level transition. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/_chunks/libs/@vue/compiler-dom.d.mts | AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration file with long re-export lines; not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/_chunks/libs/@babel/parser.d.mts | AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration file for @babel/types; long union type lines are expected. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/_chunks/libs/@vue/compiler-core.d.mts | AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration file with long type union lines; not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): New files are type declaration bundles for known upstream packages. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase is from bundled type declarations for Vue/Babel deps, not injected payloads. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/_chunks/libs/@vue/compiler-core.d.mts | AI (source-diff): False positive on a .d.mts type declaration file; no runtime network or exec calls. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:postcss-import | AI (phantom-deps): PostCSS plugin dep passed through config, not directly imported. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:postcss-loader | AI (phantom-deps): Rspack loader dep passed through config, not directly imported. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:cssnano | AI (phantom-deps): Rspack builder passes loaders/plugins to user config; declared deps not directly imported is expected pattern. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Nuxt monorepo package; README link density is from framework docs, not a link farm. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:pug-plain-loader | AI (phantom-deps): Rspack loader dep passed through config, not directly imported. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:postcss | AI (phantom-deps): Same pattern: build-tool deps passed through to rspack config, not directly imported. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:css-loader | AI (phantom-deps): Webpack/rspack loader dep passed through config, not directly imported. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tinyglobby | AI (phantom-deps): Utility dep used indirectly via config; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:url-loader | AI (phantom-deps): Rspack loader dep passed through config, not directly imported. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:file-loader | AI (phantom-deps): Rspack loader dep passed through config, not directly imported. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:postcss-url | AI (phantom-deps): PostCSS plugin dep passed through config, not directly imported. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:autoprefixer | AI (phantom-deps): PostCSS plugin dep passed through config, not directly imported. | ai |
Versions (showing 26 of 26)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.4.6 | 41 / 8 | |
| 4.4.5 | 41 / 8 | |
| 4.4.4 | 41 / 8 | |
| 4.4.2 | 42 / 8 | |
| 4.3.1 | 42 / 8 | |
| 4.3.0 | 42 / 8 | |
| 4.2.2 | 40 / 6 | |
| 4.2.1 | 40 / 6 | |
| 4.2.0 | 40 / 6 | |
| 4.1.3 | 39 / 6 | |
| 4.1.2 | 39 / 6 | |
| 4.1.1 | 39 / 6 | |
| 4.1.0 | 39 / 6 | |
| 4.0.3 | 39 / 6 | |
| 4.0.2 | 39 / 6 | |
| 4.0.1 | 39 / 6 | |
| 4.0.0 | 39 / 6 | |
| 3.21.7 | 40 / 9 | |
| 3.21.6 | 40 / 9 | |
| 3.21.5 | 40 / 9 | |
| 3.21.4 | 40 / 9 | |
| 3.21.2 | 41 / 9 | |
| 3.21.1 | 41 / 9 | |
| 3.21.0 | 41 / 9 | |
| 3.20.2 | 39 / 7 | |
| 3.20.1 | 39 / 7 |
v4.4.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.21.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.21.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.21.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.21.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.21.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.21.1
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.21.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.20.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.20.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.