@nuxt/schema
Nuxt types and default configuration
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/_chunks/libs/@unhead/vue.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Type declaration file; token matches, no actual network/exec code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/_chunks/libs/@unhead/vue.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Bundled .d.mts declaration file; long type lines, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/_chunks/libs/@babel/parser.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Long lines are TS type-union declarations in bundled .d.mts, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): Nuxt org moved to nuxtbot CI publishing; SLSA provenance confirms legitimate transition. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Official Nuxt package; README links and missing keywords are not spam indicators here. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): nuxtbot is the Nuxt org's CI bot account; stable across future versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:jiti | AI (phantom-deps): jiti is used indirectly via config resolution at runtime; phantom-dep pattern is expected for this package type. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:jiti | AI (dependencies): jiti is a legitimate TypeScript/ESM runtime loader, a core dependency in the Nuxt/Vite ecosystem. No malicious signals; stable use across many Nuxt versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:postcss-import-resolver | AI (dependencies): postcss-import-resolver is a standard PostCSS utility with no malicious signals; its use in a schema package for CSS config resolution is expected. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:c12 | AI (phantom-deps): c12 is a Nuxt config loader used indirectly at runtime; phantom-dep pattern is expected for schema/config packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:scule | AI (phantom-deps): scule is a string utility used indirectly; phantom-dep pattern is expected for schema/config packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:create-require | AI (phantom-deps): create-require is a CJS compatibility shim used indirectly; phantom-dep pattern is expected for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@nuxt/ui-templates | AI (dependencies): @nuxt/ui-templates is a first-party Nuxt package; unvetted status is a false positive for ecosystem packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:uncrypto | AI (dependencies): uncrypto is a UnJS ecosystem utility for cross-runtime crypto. Legitimate dependency maintained by the same Nuxt/UnJS team. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:compatx | AI (dependencies): compatx is a UnJS ecosystem utility, the same org as Nuxt. Legitimate dependency with stable usage across Nuxt versions. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from danielroe to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance is a standard, secure publishing practice for the Nuxt framework. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removed maintainers are known Nuxt core team; reflects shift to automated CI/CD publishing with provenance attestation. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): pkg-types is a legitimate UnJS ecosystem package maintained by the same org as Nuxt; its addition to @nuxt/schema is expected and benign. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:defu | AI (dependencies): defu is a well-known UnJS utility maintained by the same Nuxt/UnJS team; standard dependency across the Nuxt ecosystem. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:pkg-types | AI (dependencies): pkg-types is a stable utility package widely used in the Nuxt ecosystem; unvetted status does not reflect actual risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 111)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.5.1 | 6 / 35 | |
| 4.5.0 | 6 / 38 | |
| 4.4.8 | 5 / 37 | |
| 4.4.7 | 5 / 37 | |
| 4.4.6 | 5 / 37 | |
| 4.4.5 | 5 / 37 | |
| 4.4.4 | 5 / 37 | |
| 4.4.2 | 5 / 37 | |
| 4.3.1 | 5 / 37 | |
| 4.3.0 | 5 / 37 | |
| 4.2.2 | 5 / 38 | |
| 4.2.1 | 5 / 38 | |
| 4.2.0 | 5 / 38 | |
| 4.1.3 | 7 / 38 | |
| 4.1.2 | 7 / 38 | |
| 4.1.1 | 6 / 39 | |
| 4.1.0 | 6 / 39 | |
| 4.0.3 | 6 / 39 | |
| 4.0.2 | 6 / 39 | |
| 4.0.1 | 5 / 39 | |
| 4.0.0 | 5 / 39 | |
| 3.21.9 | 5 / 37 | |
| 3.21.8 | 5 / 37 | |
| 3.21.7 | 5 / 37 | |
| 3.21.6 | 5 / 37 | |
| 3.21.5 | 5 / 37 | |
| 3.21.4 | 5 / 37 | |
| 3.21.2 | 5 / 37 | |
| 3.21.1 | 5 / 37 | |
| 3.21.0 | 5 / 37 | |
| 3.20.2 | 5 / 38 | |
| 3.20.1 | 5 / 38 | |
| 3.20.0 | 5 / 38 | |
| 3.19.3 | 7 / 38 | |
| 3.19.2 | 7 / 38 | |
| 3.19.1 | 6 / 39 | |
| 3.19.0 | 6 / 39 | |
| 3.18.1 | 6 / 39 | |
| 3.18.0 | 6 / 39 | |
| 3.17.7 | 5 / 38 | |
| 3.17.6 | 5 / 38 | |
| 3.17.5 | 5 / 38 | |
| 3.17.4 | 5 / 38 | |
| 3.17.3 | 5 / 38 | |
| 3.17.2 | 5 / 38 | |
| 3.17.1 | 5 / 38 | |
| 3.17.0 | 4 / 38 | |
| 3.16.2 | 4 / 38 | |
| 3.16.1 | 4 / 38 | |
| 3.16.0 | 4 / 38 | |
| 3.15.4 | 4 / 31 |
v4.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.6
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (danielroe) on 2026-05-18, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (danielroe) on 2026-03-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.3.1
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (danielroe) on 2025-09-02, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.21.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.21.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.21.6
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (danielroe) on 2026-05-18, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.21.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.21.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.21.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.21.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.21.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.20.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.20.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.20.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.19.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.19.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.19.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.19.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (danielroe) on 2025-09-02, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.18.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.18.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.17.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.17.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.17.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.17.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.17.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.17.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.17.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.17.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.16.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.16.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.16.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.15.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.