@nylas/react
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:axios | AI (phantom-deps): Declared as runtime dep; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for bundled packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:dayjs | AI (phantom-deps): Declared as runtime dep; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for bundled packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:zustand | AI (phantom-deps): Declared as runtime dep; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for bundled packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@nylas/core | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo dep; phantom-dep heuristic false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lucide-react | AI (phantom-deps): Declared as runtime dep; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for bundled packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tailwind-variants | AI (phantom-deps): Declared as runtime dep; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for bundled packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 23 of 23)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.2.14 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.2.13 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.2.12 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.2.11 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.2.10 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.2.9 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.2.8 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.2.7 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.2.6 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.2.5 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.2.4 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.2.3 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.2.2 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.2.1 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.2.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.1.5 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.1.4 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.1.3 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.1.2 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.1.1 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.1.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.0.1 | 9 / 21 | |
| 3.0.0 | 9 / 21 |
v3.2.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (nylas-admin) on 2026-01-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.1.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (nylas-admin) on 2025-12-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.