@oh-my-pi/pi-ai
Unified LLM API with automatic model discovery and provider configuration
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:src/providers/cursor/gen/agent_pb.ts | AI (source-diff): File is protoc-gen-es generated protobuf code with base64-encoded binary descriptor — not hand-obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-bulk-read | AI (semgrep): Code explicitly filters for PI_/OMP_ prefixed keys only; this is a config migration helper, not exfiltration. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; consistent with same-org repo and author attribution. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip | AI (semgrep): 127.0.0.1:11434 is Ollama's documented local default endpoint; not a remote exfiltration target. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Base64 decoding used for image content in MCP protocol handling; standard pattern for this library. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect | AI (semgrep): Reflect.get used for safe optional property access with type guard; not obfuscation. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 118)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 15.10.10 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.10.9 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.10.8 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.10.7 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.10.6 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.10.5 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.10.4 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.10.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.10.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.10.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.10.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.9.67 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.9.5 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.9.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.9.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.9.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.8.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.8.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.8.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.7.6 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.7.5 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.7.3 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.7.2 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.7.1 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.7.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.6.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.5.15 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.5.13 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.5.12 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.5.11 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.5.10 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.5.9 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.5.8 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.5.7 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.5.6 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.5.4 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.5.3 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.5.2 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.5.1 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.5.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.4.3 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.4.2 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.4.1 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.3.2 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.3.1 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.3.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.2.4 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.2.3 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.2.2 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.2.1 | 6 / 1 | |
| 15.1.9 | 6 / 1 |
v15.10.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.10.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.10.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.10.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.10.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.10.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.10.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.10.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.10.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.10.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.10.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.9.67
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.9.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.9.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.9.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.9.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.8.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.8.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.8.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.7.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.7.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.7.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.7.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.7.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.7.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.5.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.5.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.5.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.5.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.5.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.5.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.5.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.5.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.5.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.5.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.5.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.4.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v15.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.