@oh-my-pi/pi-tui
Terminal User Interface library with differential rendering for efficient text-based applications
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Used to decode PNG image data for dimension extraction; not an execution or exfiltration pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 115)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 17.1.7 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.1.6 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.1.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.1.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.1.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.1.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.1.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.1.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.0.9 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.0.8 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.0.7 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.0.6 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.0.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.0.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.0.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.0.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.0.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 17.0.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 16.5.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 16.5.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 16.5.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 16.4.8 | 4 / 2 | |
| 16.4.6 | 4 / 2 | |
| 16.4.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 16.4.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 16.3.11 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.5.15 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.5.13 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.5.12 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.5.11 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.5.10 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.5.9 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.5.8 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.5.7 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.5.6 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.5.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.5.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.5.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.5.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.5.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.4.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.4.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.4.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.3.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.3.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.3.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.2.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.2.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.2.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.2.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.1.9 | 4 / 2 |
v17.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.4.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.4.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.4.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (can1357) on 2026-07-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v16.3.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.