@oh-my-pi/pi-utils
Shared utilities for pi packages
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New dep is a same-org sibling package at matching version from the same trusted publisher; not a suspicious third-party addition. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Spreading process.env into spawn options is standard for shell process managers; not exfiltration. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Publisher appears to have switched to local publish workflow; no other risk signals present. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:handlebars | AI (dependencies): handlebars is a well-known, established templating library; not a supply-chain risk for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Provenance absence is common (~88% of npm); no other risk signals present for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 320)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 17.1.5 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.1.4 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.1.3 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.1.2 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.1.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.1.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.0.9 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.0.8 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.0.7 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.0.6 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.0.5 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.0.4 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.0.3 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.0.2 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.0.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 17.0.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 16.5.2 | 4 / 1 | |
| 16.5.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 16.5.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 16.4.8 | 4 / 1 | |
| 16.4.6 | 4 / 1 | |
| 16.4.5 | 4 / 1 | |
| 16.4.4 | 4 / 1 | |
| 15.4.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.2.4 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.1.8 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.1.5 | 5 / 1 | |
| 15.1.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.1.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.0.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 15.0.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.9.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.9.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.9.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.9.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.9.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.8.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.8.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.7.6 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.7.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.7.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.7.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.7.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.6.6 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.6.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.6.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.6.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.6.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.6.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.6.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 14.5.14 | 4 / 2 |
v17.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v17.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.4.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.4.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.4.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (can1357) on 2026-07-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.