@omni-bridge/core
Core types, validation, and API client for Omni Bridge
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Likely a CI/publish environment change; no other risk signals present to corroborate malicious intent. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package consistently published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation; stable supply chain signal. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:near-kit | AI (dependencies): Expected dependency for a NEAR Protocol bridge SDK; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@wormhole-foundation/sdk | AI (dependencies): Expected dependency for a cross-chain bridge SDK integrating Wormhole; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped bridge SDK package; not a typosquat of cors — different domain, org, and purpose entirely. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.9.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.8.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.8.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.7.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.6.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.6.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.5.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.4.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.3.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.2.3 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.0.4 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.0.3 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 4 / 1 |
v0.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ricky-is.
v0.0.4
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ricky-is.
v0.0.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ricky-is.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.