@open-mercato/sync-akeneo
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA attestation present; missing gitHead is a minor env artifact, not a tampering signal for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Part of a large private-org monorepo; sparse metadata is consistent across all versions, not a malware indicator. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@open-mercato/ui | AI (dependencies): Same monorepo/publisher as this package; version-locked to 0.5.0. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@open-mercato/core | AI (dependencies): Same monorepo/publisher as this package; version-locked to 0.5.0. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:node-html-markdown | AI (dependencies): Established HTML-to-markdown utility; no known malicious history. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.6.3 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.6.2 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.6.1 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.6.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.5.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.4.10 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.4.9 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.4.8 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.4.7 | 3 / 6 |
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: piotrkarwatka.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: piotrkarwatka.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.9
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: piotrkarwatka.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.