@openapi-generator-plus/testing
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Monorepo sub-package; missing description is a consistent pattern across versions, not a malware indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.27.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.26.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.25.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.24.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.23.1 | 3 / 0 |
v2.26.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.25.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.24.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.23.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.