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@openclaw/bluebubbles

OpenClaw BlueBubbles channel plugin

23
Versions
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

steipetevincentkoc

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Package publishes via GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; automated publisher is expected and stable. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): Active development project; maintainer addition alongside CI/CD pipeline setup is a normal team expansion pattern. ai
semgrep semgrep:etc-passwd-access AI (semgrep): Appears in a test asserting the code rejects /etc/passwd paths — security validation, not credential harvesting. ai
semgrep semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip AI (semgrep): Raw IPs are private/local addresses used as test fixtures in test files, not production network calls. ai

Versions (showing 23 of 23)

Version Deps Published
2026.5.7 0 / 2
2026.5.6 0 / 2
2026.5.5 0 / 2
2026.5.4 0 / 2
2026.5.3 0 / 2
2026.5.2 0 / 2
2026.3.13 1 / 0
2026.3.12 1 / 0
2026.3.11 1 / 0
2026.3.10 1 / 0
2026.3.7 1 / 0
2026.3.2 0 / 0
2026.3.1 0 / 0
2026.2.25 0 / 0
2026.2.24 0 / 0
2026.2.23 0 / 1
2026.2.22 0 / 1
2026.2.21 0 / 1
2026.2.19 0 / 1
2026.2.17 0 / 1
2026.2.15 0 / 1
2026.2.14 0 / 1
2026.2.13 0 / 1

v2026.5.7

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: steipete → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-07) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2026.5.6

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: steipete → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2026.5.5

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: steipete → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2026.5.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: steipete → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-05) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2026.5.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: steipete → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-04) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2026.5.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: steipete → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-02) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2026.3.13

2 findings
HIGH etc-passwd-access: src/media-send.test.ts:164 semgrep

Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 162 | cfg: createConfig(), 163 | to: "chat:123", > 164 | mediaPath: "/etc/passwd", 165 | }), 166 | ).rejects.toThrow(/mediaLocalRoots/i);

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2026.3.12

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2026.3.11

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2026.3.10

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2026.3.7

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2026.3.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2026.3.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2026.2.25

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2026.2.24

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2026.2.23

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2026.2.22

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2026.2.21

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2026.2.19

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2026.2.17

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2026.2.15

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2026.2.14

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2026.2.13

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.