@openclaw/lobster
Lobster workflow tool plugin (typed pipelines + resumable approvals)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Explained by bundledDependencies shipping full dist/test trees, not injected code. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase matches bundled dependency swap (typebox family). | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@clawdbot/lobster | AI (phantom-deps): Referenced via plugin config, not direct import; expected for a plugin loader. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Pattern is passing process.env to child process with an added key; not exfiltration. Stable for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 25 of 25)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2026.7.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.6.33 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.6.10 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.13 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.12 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.11 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.10 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.25 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.24 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.23 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.22 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.21 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.19 | 0 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.17 | 0 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.15 | 0 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.13 | 0 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.12 | 0 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.9 | 0 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.6 | 0 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 2026.1.29 | 0 / 0 |
v2026.7.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (steipete) on 2026-07-13, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2026.6.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.6.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.