@openclaw/msteams
OpenClaw Microsoft Teams channel plugin
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:etc-passwd-access | AI (semgrep): Fires in a test file asserting /etc/passwd URLs are rejected — negative test, not credential harvesting. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip | AI (semgrep): Fires in a test file asserting SSRF to metadata IP is rejected — negative test, not a real request. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package publishes via GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance; CI/CD publisher is the intended pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@azure/identity | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped Azure identity package loaded by convention; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Fires in a test file only; spreading process.env to inject a test-specific state dir is a standard test pattern, not a secret leak. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Decoding base64 attachment bytes from MS Graph API is expected behavior for a Teams channel plugin. | ai |
Versions (showing 38 of 38)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2026.6.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.28 | 5 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.27 | 7 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.26 | 7 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.22 | 7 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.20 | 7 / 3 | |
| 2026.5.19 | 7 / 3 | |
| 2026.5.18 | 7 / 3 | |
| 2026.5.12 | 7 / 3 | |
| 2026.5.7 | 7 / 3 | |
| 2026.5.6 | 7 / 3 | |
| 2026.5.5 | 7 / 3 | |
| 2026.5.4 | 7 / 3 | |
| 2026.5.3 | 7 / 3 | |
| 2026.5.2 | 7 / 3 | |
| 2026.3.13 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.12 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.11 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.10 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.25 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.24 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.23 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.22 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.21 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.19 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.17 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.15 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.14 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.13 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.12 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.9 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.6 | 6 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.3 | 6 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.2 | 6 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.1 | 6 / 1 |
v2026.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.2
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux Source: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/8842a5bd43a6874c86645d00dab80611a94d5850/src/file-consent.test.ts#L226 224 | it("rejects file:// protocol", async () => { 225 | await expect( > 226 | validateConsentUploadUrl("file:///etc/passwd", { resolveFn: publicResolve }), 227 | ).rejects.toThrow("must use HTTPS"); 228 | });
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.3.13
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 16 | const stateDir = await fs.promises.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "openclaw-msteams-store-")); 17 | > 18 | const env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = { 19 | ...process.env, 20 | OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR: stateDir,
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2026.3.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.3.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.3.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.3.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2026.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2026.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.