@openclaw/nostr
OpenClaw Nostr channel plugin for NIP-04 encrypted DMs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; this is the expected publisher going forward. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): vincentkoc added as maintainer alongside CI migration; consistent with legitimate project handoff/expansion. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:etc-passwd-access | AI (semgrep): Appears only in a fuzz test validating that file:///etc/passwd URLs are rejected — not credential harvesting. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip | AI (semgrep): Raw IP appears in a test asserting SSRF protection (private IP rejection), not in production code. | ai |
Versions (showing 38 of 38)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2026.6.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.28 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.27 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.26 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.22 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.20 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.19 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.18 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.12 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.7 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.6 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.5 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.4 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.3 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.3.13 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.12 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.11 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.10 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.25 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.24 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.23 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.22 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.21 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.19 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.17 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.15 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.14 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.13 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.12 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.9 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.6 | 3 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 2026.1.29 | 3 / 0 |
v2026.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.3.13
2 findingsAccessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 278 | it("rejects file: URL", () => { 279 | const profile = { > 280 | picture: "file:///etc/passwd", 281 | }; 282 | const result = validateProfile(profile);
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2026.3.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.3.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.3.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.3.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2026.1.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.