@openclaw/synology-chat
Synology Chat channel plugin for OpenClaw
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package publishes via GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; automated publisher is the intended release mechanism. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer addition consistent with org-level transition; SLSA provenance backs legitimacy. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Fires in a test file saving/restoring env vars — standard test setup pattern, not a secret leak risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2026.6.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.28 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.27 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.26 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.22 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.20 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.5.19 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.5.18 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.5.12 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.5.7 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.5.6 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.5.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.5.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.5.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.5.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.22 | 1 / 1 |
v2026.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.5.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.2.22
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 3 | 4 | // Save and restore env vars > 5 | const originalEnv = { ...process.env }; 6 | 7 | beforeEach(() => {
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.