@openclaw/zalouser
OpenClaw Zalo Personal Account plugin via native zca-js integration
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Move to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; provenance improvement, not a takeover. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Explained by bundledDependencies vendoring transitive libs, not injected code. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size growth matches bundled deps declared in package.json. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Provenance-attested CI/CD publish; move is a supply-chain improvement. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): env-spread is used to pass environment to a child process spawn — standard CLI wrapper pattern, not exfiltration. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Decodes QR code image data to a temp file — benign, stable pattern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 45 of 45)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2026.7.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.6.11 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.6.10 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.6.9 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.6.8 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.6.6 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.6.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.6.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.28 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.27 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.26 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.22 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.5.20 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.19 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.18 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.12 | 3 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.7 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.6 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.5 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.4 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.3 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.5.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2026.3.13 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.12 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.11 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.10 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.7 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2026.3.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.25 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.24 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2026.2.23 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.22 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.21 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.19 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.17 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.15 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.14 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.13 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.12 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.9 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.6 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.2.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 2026.1.29 | 2 / 0 |
v2026.7.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (steipete) on 2026-07-13, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2026.6.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.6.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.