@openclawbrain/learner
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@openclawbrain/compiler | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org package; likely used transitively or re-exported rather than directly imported. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 5 / 0 |
v0.2.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jonathangu.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.