@opengeoweb/metronome
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 18.0.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 17.2.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 17.0.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 14.4.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 14.3.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 14.2.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 14.2.1 | 0 / 1 |
v18.0.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (oyvindim) than the most recent previously approved version (karoliinahautala) on 2026-05-28, but oyvindim is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v17.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v17.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v14.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v14.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v14.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v14.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.