@openpairings/gridswiss-darwin-x64
macOS x64 native binding for GridSwiss.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Minimal platform-specific binary shard; no repo/readme/deps is normal for this pattern. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binding package; .node binary is the intended artifact for darwin-x64. | ai |
v0.1.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • native/gridswiss.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • native/gridswiss.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • native/gridswiss.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • native/gridswiss.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.