@openpairings/gridswiss-win32-arm64
Windows arm64 native binding for GridSwiss.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binding package; .node binary is the intended artifact for this optional-dep pattern. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): No-deps and sparse README are expected for a platform-specific binary shard package. | ai |
v0.1.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • native/gridswiss.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • native/gridswiss.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • native/gridswiss.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • native/gridswiss.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.