@opensea/seaport-js
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | url-dep:seaport | AI (npm-metadata): Dev-only pin to OpenSea's own seaport repo, not third-party; stable across versions. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Manual->CI/CD provenance improvement, not a compromise indicator. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Org-side maintainer reshuffle alongside CI/CD provenance adoption. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): husky install is a standard dev-tooling git-hooks setup; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:hex-decode | AI (semgrep): Hex conversion utilities for EIP-712 signing; expected in a blockchain SDK, not malicious. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.2 | 2 / 16 | |
| 4.0.7 | 2 / 32 | |
| 4.0.6 | 2 / 33 | |
| 4.0.4 | 2 / 33 |
v4.0.7
3 findingsDependency 'seaport' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:ProjectOpenSea/seaport#080133906585660f6a76b82984f3fb690ff4b2a9' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.6
3 findingsDependency 'seaport' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:ProjectOpenSea/seaport#080133906585660f6a76b82984f3fb690ff4b2a9' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.