@opentelemetry/instrumentation-fetch
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; expected for OpenTelemetry org. | ai |
Versions (showing 35 of 35)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.221.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.220.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.219.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.218.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.217.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.216.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.215.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.214.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.213.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.212.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.211.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.210.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.209.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.208.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.207.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.206.0 | 4 / 26 | |
| 0.205.0 | 4 / 27 | |
| 0.204.0 | 4 / 27 | |
| 0.203.0 | 4 / 28 | |
| 0.202.0 | 4 / 28 | |
| 0.201.1 | 4 / 28 | |
| 0.201.0 | 4 / 28 | |
| 0.200.0 | 4 / 28 | |
| 0.57.2 | 4 / 28 | |
| 0.57.1 | 4 / 28 | |
| 0.57.0 | 4 / 28 | |
| 0.56.0 | 4 / 28 | |
| 0.55.0 | 4 / 28 | |
| 0.54.2 | 4 / 28 | |
| 0.54.1 | 4 / 28 | |
| 0.54.0 | 4 / 28 | |
| 0.53.0 | 4 / 29 | |
| 0.52.1 | 4 / 30 | |
| 0.52.0 | 4 / 30 | |
| 0.51.1 | 4 / 30 |
v0.221.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.220.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.200.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.57.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.57.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.57.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.56.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.55.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.54.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.54.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.54.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (dyladan) than the most recent previously approved version (pichlermarc) on 2024-10-23, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.53.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.52.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.52.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.51.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.