@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate transition from human publisher (amxx) to GitHub Actions CI/CD for OpenZeppelin, a major org. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Side effect of switching to GitHub Actions publishing; no security concern for this well-known package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): OpenZeppelin publishes regularly; dormancy metric likely reflects scoped package gap, not actual inactivity. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Informational only; OpenZeppelin is a trusted publisher with verified GitHub org. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.6.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 5.6.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 5.5.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 5.4.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.9.6 | 0 / 0 |
v5.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.6.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.4.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.9.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.