@openzeppelin/defender-sdk-deploy-client
3
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
No SLSA provenance
npm registry signatures
gitHead linked
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
frangionamiszeljkoxdylkilmcarlomagnocollins-oztirumerlabjmrqpasevinson-oz
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): OpenZeppelin is a well-established organization; lack of Sigstore provenance is common and not indicative of risk for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@openzeppelin/defender-sdk-base-client | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the same OpenZeppelin Defender SDK monorepo; dependency is expected and benign. | ai |
v2.7.1
1 finding
LOW
No provenance attestation
provenance
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.7.0
1 finding
INFO
Has SLSA provenance attestation
provenance
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.0
1 finding
INFO
Has SLSA provenance attestation
provenance
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.