@operato/context
Webcomponent context following open-wc recommendations
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Part of established hatiolab/operato monorepo; dormancy likely reflects project cadence, not takeover. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@operato/input | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the same @operato monorepo; consistent with all other @operato/* deps in this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Org-published monorepo package; no provenance is consistent across all 625 versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.2.25 | 10 / 17 | |
| 9.2.22 | 10 / 17 | |
| 9.2.21 | 10 / 17 | |
| 9.2.20 | 10 / 17 | |
| 9.2.19 | 10 / 17 | |
| 9.2.18 | 10 / 17 | |
| 9.2.6 | 10 / 17 | |
| 9.2.5 | 10 / 17 | |
| 9.2.1 | 10 / 17 | |
| 9.2.0 | 10 / 17 | |
| 8.2.22 | 10 / 17 | |
| 8.2.20 | 10 / 17 | |
| 8.2.19 | 10 / 17 | |
| 8.2.18 | 10 / 17 | |
| 8.2.17 | 10 / 17 | |
| 8.2.16 | 10 / 17 | |
| 8.2.15 | 10 / 17 |
v9.2.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.2.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.2.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.2.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.2.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.2.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.2.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.2.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.2.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.2.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.2.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.2.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.2.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.2.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.