@operato/input
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@codemirror/state | AI (phantom-deps): CodeMirror state is a transitive/config-level dep in this webcomponent package; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/codemirror | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only package loaded by convention; not directly imported by design. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.2.25 | 23 / 18 | |
| 9.2.12 | 23 / 18 | |
| 9.2.1 | 23 / 18 | |
| 9.2.0 | 23 / 18 |
v9.2.25
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (nalshya113) than the most recent previously approved version (heartyoh) on 2026-05-27, but nalshya113 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v9.2.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.