@optimizely/optimizely-sdk
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:murmurhash | AI (dependencies): murmurhash is a legitimate, well-known hashing library; its use in Optimizely SDK for user bucketing is expected and stable across versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.4.0 | 4 / 49 | |
| 6.3.1 | 4 / 49 | |
| 6.3.0 | 4 / 44 | |
| 6.2.0 | 4 / 44 | |
| 6.1.0 | 4 / 46 | |
| 6.0.0 | 4 / 46 | |
| 5.4.1 | 5 / 47 | |
| 5.3.0 | 5 / 47 |
v6.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.