@orpc/interop
> [!WARNING] > This is an internal package. Breaking changes may be introduced without notice - use at your own risk.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): dinwwwh is a known prior maintainer (email-matched); provenance-confirmed manual publish, not a hijack. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; benign for this package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Established high-download orpc subpackage; missing description is stable, not malicious. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 54)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.14.12 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.14.10 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.14.9 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.14.8 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.14.7 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.14.6 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.14.5 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.14.4 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.14.3 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.14.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.14.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.14.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.14 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.13 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.12 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.11 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.10 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.9 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.8 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.7 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.6 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.5 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.4 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.3 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.13.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.12.3 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.12.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.12.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.12.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.11.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.11.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.11.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.11.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.10.4 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.10.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.10.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.10.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.10.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.9.4 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.9.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.9.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.9.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.9.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.8.9 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.8.8 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.8.7 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.8.6 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.8.5 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.8.4 | 0 / 3 |
v1.14.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.14.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.14.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.14.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.14.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.13.13
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-03-26, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.13.12
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-03-26, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.13.11
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-03-25, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.13.10
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-03-24, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.13.9
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-03-19, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.13.8
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-03-18, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.13.7
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-03-13, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.