@oslokommune/auth-bff
A NodeJS Backend for frontend.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Scoped org package with a clear GitHub repo; missing description is cosmetic, not a malware indicator. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Org-published package with public GitHub repo; lack of Sigstore attestation is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.2.0 | 14 / 11 | |
| 2.1.0 | 14 / 11 | |
| 2.0.2 | 14 / 11 | |
| 2.0.1 | 14 / 11 | |
| 2.0.0 | 14 / 11 | |
| 1.6.1 | 14 / 4 |
v2.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.