@outburn/format-converter
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/browser.js | AI (source-diff): dist/browser.js is standard minified build output from tsup; content is readable format-conversion logic with no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/browser/browser.js | AI (source-diff): Standard minified browser bundle output from tsup build; content is readable format-conversion logic, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher with SLSA provenance is a legitimate CI/CD automation pattern for this org. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance via Sigstore is a strong supply chain integrity signal; stable for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.1 | 5 / 8 | |
| 2.0.0 | 5 / 8 | |
| 1.0.6 | 5 / 8 | |
| 1.0.5 | 5 / 8 | |
| 1.0.4 | 5 / 8 | |
| 1.0.3 | 5 / 9 | |
| 1.0.1 | 5 / 9 | |
| 1.0.0 | 5 / 9 |
v2.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.6
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.4
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.