@owenlamont/ryl-linux-s390x-gnu
Fast YAML linter inspired by yamllint
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific binary shard; the compiled binary is the intended artifact, backed by SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): No-dep, sparse-README pattern is expected for a CPU/OS-specific optional binary package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.8.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.2 | 0 / 0 |
v0.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.4
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.