@oxc-parser/binding-wasm32-wasi
Oxc Parser Node API
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Expected compiled wasm parser artifact for this napi binding package. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:browser-bundle.js | AI (source-diff): browser-bundle.js is the WASM browser bundle; fetch+instantiate is the standard WASM loading pattern, not dropper malware. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): oxc-project migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate automated release. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect | AI (semgrep): Reflect.get in WASM memory proxy handler; standard emnapi/wasm-runtime pattern, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@emnapi/core | AI (phantom-deps): @emnapi/core is a declared runtime dep used by the WASM bundle indirectly; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): emnapi callback wrapper uses new Function to create named wrappers; documented runtime pattern. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:toplevel-fetch | AI (semgrep): Top-level fetch loads the .wasm binary in browser bundle; expected and benign for WASM packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 100 of 100)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.141.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.140.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.139.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.138.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.137.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.136.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.135.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.134.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.133.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.132.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.131.0 | 3 / 0 | |
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| 0.128.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.127.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.126.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.125.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.124.0 | 1 / 0 | |
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| 0.121.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.120.0 | 1 / 0 | |
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| 0.118.0 | 1 / 0 | |
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| 0.116.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.115.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.114.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.112.0 | 1 / 0 | |
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| 0.109.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.108.0 | 1 / 0 | |
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| 0.106.0 | 1 / 0 | |
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| 0.99.0 | 1 / 0 | |
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| 0.96.0 | 1 / 0 | |
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| 0.90.0 | 1 / 0 | |
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| 0.88.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.87.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.86.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.85.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.84.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.82.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.82.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.82.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.82.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.81.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.80.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.79.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.79.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.78.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.77.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.77.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.77.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.77.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.76.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.75.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.75.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.74.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.73.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.73.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.72.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.72.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.72.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.72.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.71.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.70.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.69.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.68.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.68.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.67.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.66.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.65.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.64.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.63.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.62.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.61.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.61.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.60.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.58.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.58.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.57.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.56.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.56.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.56.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.56.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.56.1 | 1 / 0 |
v0.141.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.140.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.139.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.138.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.137.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.67.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.66.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.65.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.64.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.63.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.62.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.61.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.61.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.60.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.58.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.58.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.57.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.56.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.56.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.56.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.56.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.56.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • parser.wasm32-wasi.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.