@oxc-resolver/binding-openharmony-arm64
Oxc Resolver Node API
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific binding stub from trusted oxc-resolver publisher; 0.0.0 is intentional placeholder versioning. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Minimal metadata is expected for a native binding stub in the oxc ecosystem from a highly trusted publisher. | ai | |
| — | bundled-binaries | platform-specific prebuilt oxc-resolver native binding from @boshen (HIGH trust); bundled native binary is the package's intended purpose | sean |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.20.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 11.19.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 11.19.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 11.18.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 11.17.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 11.17.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 11.16.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 11.16.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 11.16.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 11.16.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 11.16.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 11.15.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 11.14.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v11.20.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.19.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.19.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.18.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.17.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.17.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.16.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.16.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.16.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.16.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.16.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.15.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.14.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.