@oxfmt/binding-darwin-x64
Formatter for the JavaScript Oxidation Compiler
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher (boshen) to GitHub Actions CI/CD is expected for automated binary release pipelines; SLSA attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Platform binding stub; 0.0.0 is a common placeholder version for native binding packages in this pattern. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Native binding stub packages in this ecosystem pattern typically omit descriptions. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binding package; .node binary is the intended artifact, published with SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): No-dep, minimal-README pattern is expected for a platform-specific binary sub-package of a monorepo. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.52.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.51.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.50.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.49.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.48.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.47.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.46.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.43.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.52.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.51.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.50.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.48.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.46.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.45.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.44.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.43.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.