@oxfmt/binding-linux-arm-musleabihf
Formatter for the JavaScript Oxidation Compiler
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI is expected for oxc-project; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate pipeline. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific binding stub; 0.0.0 is a known placeholder pattern for NAPI-RS optional platform packages. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Stub binding package; missing description is expected for this pattern. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binding; .node binary is the package's sole purpose, built with SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Binary-only binding packages have no deps and minimal READMEs by design; not spam. | ai |
Versions (showing 33 of 33)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.60.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.59.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.58.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.57.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.56.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.55.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.54.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.53.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.52.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.51.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.50.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.49.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.48.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.47.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.46.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.43.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.42.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.41.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.40.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.39.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.38.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.37.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.36.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.35.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.34.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.33.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.32.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.31.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.30.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.29.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.60.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.59.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.58.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.57.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.56.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.42.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.41.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.40.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.39.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.38.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.37.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.36.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.35.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.34.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.33.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.32.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.31.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.30.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.29.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (boshen) on 2026-02-10, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.