@oxlint/binding-freebsd-x64
Linter for the JavaScript Oxidation Compiler
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): oxc-project publishes platform bindings via GitHub Actions CI; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate automated release pipeline. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Intentional placeholder package; 0.0.0 is the documented stub version for unimplemented platform bindings in the oxlint ecosystem. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Native .node binding is the sole purpose of this platform-specific package; expected and attested via SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binding packages legitimately have no deps and minimal READMEs; not spam. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.67.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.66.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.65.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.64.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.63.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.62.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.61.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.60.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.59.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.58.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v1.67.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.66.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.65.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.64.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.63.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.61.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.60.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.59.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.58.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.