@pagopa/io-wallet-oid4vp
This package provides utilities for the **OpenID for Verifiable Presentations (OID4VP)** flow in the Italian Wallet ecosystem.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer rotation within pagopa org; consistent with org-managed package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer rotation within pagopa org; consistent with org-managed package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@openid4vc/utils | AI (phantom-deps): Declared as peer/transitive dep for type resolution; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): PagoPA org migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD; SLSA provenance attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package consistently published with SLSA provenance; stable positive signal. | ai |
Versions (showing 24 of 24)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.5.1 | 7 / 2 | |
| 1.5.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 1.4.2 | 7 / 2 | |
| 1.4.1 | 7 / 2 | |
| 1.4.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 1.3.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 1.2.1 | 7 / 2 | |
| 1.2.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 1.1.2 | 7 / 2 | |
| 1.1.1 | 7 / 2 | |
| 1.1.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.7.7 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.7.6 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.7.5 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.7.3 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.7.2 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.7.1 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.7.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.6.2 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.6.1 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.6.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.5.1 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.5.0 | 5 / 2 |
v1.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.