@papit/create
Project and package scaffolding tool for @papit — opinionated, consistent, and designed to kickstart Papit-based projects with the correct structure from day one.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher is GitHub Actions with SLSA attestation; CI/CD publishing is the documented workflow for this org. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Pattern is in a spawned-child helper template; passing process.env to child processes is standard and not exfiltration. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.10 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.9 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.8 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.7 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.6 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.5 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.4 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.1 | 3 / 2 |
v0.0.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.