@paradoc/cli
CLI tool for Paradoc framework
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/chunk-4YDL33UK.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled @paradoc/core schema/validation code; not malware. Pattern expected for tsup-built CLI in this monorepo. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/chunk-5BVIVAAI.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled CLI dist chunk; sample shows schema/validation code, no obfuscation or malicious network+exec pattern. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): CLI tool bundles monorepo deps via tsup; large file count is expected for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped @paradoc/cli is unrelated to joi; Levenshtein match is coincidental. | ai |
v0.2.0
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.