@pdfme/converter
TypeScript base PDF generator and React base UI. Open source, developed by the community, and completely free to use under the MIT license!
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase is due to bundling the 2MB pdfjs-dist worker; expected and benign. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/pdfjs-worker-BpS0tFhy.js | AI (source-diff): File is the bundled pdfjs-dist worker (Mozilla Apache-2.0); minification is expected for this dependency. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/assets/pdfjs-worker-BpS0tFhy.js | AI (source-diff): Network+exec pattern is inherent to the PDF.js worker; not malicious in this context. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/assets/pdfjs-worker-DNts7nT2.js | AI (source-diff): pdfjs worker legitimately uses network (fetch PDF data) and dynamic execution; standard behavior for this Mozilla library. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/pdfjs-worker-DNts7nT2.js | AI (source-diff): This is the bundled pdfjs-dist worker (Mozilla Foundation, Apache 2.0); minification is expected for this artifact. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is a stable monorepo convention for @pdfme/* packages, not a throwaway pattern. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher with SLSA attestation; legitimate automation handoff for pdfme monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pdfme/common | AI (dependencies): Same pdfme monorepo sibling; wildcard version is standard monorepo practice, not a supply-chain risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.1.2 | 7 / 3 | |
| 6.1.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.1.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.0.6 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.0.5 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.0.3 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.0.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 5.5.10 | 3 / 3 | |
| 5.5.9 | 3 / 3 | |
| 5.5.8 | 3 / 3 | |
| 5.5.7 | 3 / 3 | |
| 5.5.6 | 3 / 3 | |
| 5.5.5 | 3 / 3 | |
| 5.5.4 | 3 / 3 | |
| 5.5.3 | 3 / 3 | |
| 5.5.2 | 3 / 3 | |
| 5.5.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 5.5.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 5.4.8 | 3 / 3 | |
| 5.4.7 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.0 | 3 / 3 |
v6.1.2
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.1
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.5
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.5.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.5.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.5.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.5.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.4.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.4.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.