@peac/adapter-x402
x402 offer/receipt verification, term-matching, and PEAC record mapping
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is confirmed legitimate by SLSA/Sigstore attestation on the same version. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): CI/CD publish via GitHub Actions with SLSA attestation supersedes gitHead as provenance signal. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Low-signal for this package; no other risk indicators present. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@peac/crypto | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling package at matching version pin; consistent pattern across all @peac/* releases. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@peac/protocol | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling package at matching version pin; consistent pattern across all @peac/* releases. | ai |
Versions (showing 32 of 32)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.15.0 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.14.5 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.14.4 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.14.3 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.14.2 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.14.1 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.14.0 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.13.4 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.13.3 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.13.2 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.13.1 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.13.0 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.12.14 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.12.13 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.12.12 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.12.11 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.12.10 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.12.9 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.12.8 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.12.7 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.12.6 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.12.5 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.12.4 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.12.3 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.12.2 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.12.1 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.12.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.11.3 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.11.2 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.11.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.10.6 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.10.5 | 3 / 3 |
v0.15.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.5
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.4
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.3
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.3
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: peacprotocol.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.10.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.