@peac/mcp-server
PEAC receipt operations as MCP tools (verify, inspect, decode, issue, bundle)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publishing confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; consistent with intentional CI/CD migration. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@peac/crypto | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling package versioned in lockstep; same publisher and provenance chain. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@peac/protocol | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling package versioned in lockstep; same publisher and provenance chain. | ai |
Versions (showing 30 of 30)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.15.0 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.14.5 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.14.4 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.14.3 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.14.2 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.14.1 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.14.0 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.13.4 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.13.3 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.13.2 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.13.1 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.13.0 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.14 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.13 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.12 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.11 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.10 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.9 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.8 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.7 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.6 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.5 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.4 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.3 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.2 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.1 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.12.0 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.11.3 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.11.2 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.10.13 | 6 / 4 |
v0.15.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.