@peerbit/any-store-interface
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Trusted long-standing publisher, no code changes; consistent with monorepo tooling variance. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): No material diff vs prior version; benign lockstep monorepo release. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package in the peerbit ecosystem; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.1.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.1.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v1.1.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: marcus.pousette.
v1.1.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: marcus.pousette.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.