@perses-dev/components
Common UI components used across Perses features
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@perses-dev/core | AI (dependencies): Same-monorepo sibling dependency; always co-published at matching versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Perses monorepo publishes via bot without Sigstore attestation; stable pattern across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.53.1 | 20 / 1 | |
| 0.53.0 | 20 / 1 | |
| 0.52.0 | 20 / 0 | |
| 0.51.1 | 20 / 0 | |
| 0.51.0 | 20 / 0 |
v0.53.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.53.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.52.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.51.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.51.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.