@phosphor/messaging
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): blink1073 (Steven Silvester) was already a listed contributor in package.json before taking over publishing; legitimate handoff within the PhosphorJS project team. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): blink1073 is a highly trusted publisher (3747 approved packages) and was already a contributor; phosphor-user addition is consistent with org-level maintenance. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of 'phosphor' maintainer is consistent with a planned project transition; no malicious indicators present. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by years; absence is expected for this vintage of PhosphorJS packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.0 | 2 / 14 | |
| 1.2.3 | 2 / 14 | |
| 1.2.2 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.2.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.2.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.1.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 0 |
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-06-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.